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We study how transition has affected human resource policies of a Russian heavy industry firm. Our
data set contains personnel files of 1538 white-collar workers over 17 years: from 1984 to 2000. We
find career paths before the first year of Gaidar's reforms, 1992, when Russian transition to a market
economy began. After 1992, promotions are blocked, because both (i) more managers are hired from
the outside, and (ii) fewer managers leave the firm. A possible reason is an extremely weak outsider
property rights enforcement in Russia. Keywords: institutional environment and internal labor market,
transition to a market economy.
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How do ﬁrms adjust their personnel policies and internal structure to
changes in their economic and institutional environment? Chandler
(1977) has investigated how ﬁrms in the last century reacted to chal-
lenges posed by new technologies and by market demands by developing
professional management, the line/staﬀ and later the multidivisional or-
ganization. Doeringer and Piore (1971) have documented how and why
ﬁrms created internal labor markets to protect their workers from mar-
ket shocks and to provide them with incentives to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital. Following Carter and Carter (1985), Lazear (1992), and
Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994), a large number of studies has in-
vestigated the personnel ﬁles of single ﬁrms over a long period of time
to learn more about their internal labor markets.1 One main ﬁnding is
that a ﬁrm’s organization structure and career paths remain remarkably
stable, even in turbulent times.
In this paper, we investigate how Russian transition from a centrally-
planned to a market economy has aﬀected human resource policies of a
heavy industry ﬁrm. We use personnel data set that covers a total of
1538 white-collar workers over up to 17 years: from 1984 to 2000. We
ﬁnd that from 1984 to 1991 (hereafter, in Soviet times), the ﬁrm featured
stable patterns of upward mobility that look quite similar to the career
paths in western ﬁrms. Fromthe year 1992 when Gaidar’s reforms began,
to 2000 (hereafter, during the transition), we do not observe career paths
anymore. The reason is that in all tiers of the ﬁrm’s hierarchy except
for the lowest one, both (i) more managers are hired from the outside
market, and (ii) fewer managers leave the ﬁrm. As a result, the ﬁrm
becomes “toploaded”, and promotions are blocked.
A possible reason is an extremely weak protection of outsider prop-
erty rights in Russia (see for instance, Woodruﬀ 2004). When the ﬁrm
1Including Ariga et al (1999), Dohmen (2004) and Dohmen et al (2004), Ichino
(1999), Seltzer and Merret (2000), Treble et al (2001).
2was privatized in 1993 through the so-called option 2 of the Russian
voucher privatization, insiders received privileges for the acquisition of
shares. Eﬀectively, incumbent managers became the owners. They had
an opportunity to hire managers who had a higher human capital than
themselves,2 most probably because skilled employees were leaving less
successful enterprises.3 The manager-owners decided both (i) to take an
advantage of this opportunity, and (ii) to stay in the ﬁrm (in order to
enforce their property rights),4 scarifying thereby the incentivising- and
signalling beneﬁts from promotions.5
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes the
ownership structure, output performance, and employment policies from
the ﬁrm-level perspective. Section 3 uses the personnel data to compare
human resource policies in Soviet times and during the transition. The
last Section discusses the main insights. All Figures are collected in the
Appendix.
2 The ﬁrm and its environment
The ﬁrm that we investigate is one of the largest enterprises in the ma-
chinery industry in Russia. It was established in 1949. Prior to transi-
tion, it was one of the leading companies in the industry and was awarded
a number of distinctions. This Section uses ﬁrm-level data6 to describe
2Managers hired after 1992, where both more experienced and better educated
than incumbents working on the same level.
3Between 1996 and 1999, industrial employment in the region where the ﬁrm that
we study is located has decreased by 9%. In the same period, the employment in the
ﬁrm has decreased by only 6%.
4Potentially, the newly hired managers could take over the control. However, an
obstacle, once again, was a weak enforcement of outsider ownership rights: it was
limiting bank credit for acquisition of the ﬁrm’s shares.
5Career prospects are among the most important instruments for encouraging
employees to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (see Gibbons and Waldman 1999).
Also, promotions signal the quality of employees, helping thereby to better allocate
them among tasks (see Waldman, 1984; Sattinger, 1993).
6Unfortunately, we have no individual-level information about blue-collar workers,
except for those of them who at some stage in their career moved into white collar or
managerial positions. However, we have ﬁrm-level information about the employment
and wages by both blue- and white collars.
3how the ﬁrm was evolving in a changing institutional environment.
Ownership structure In March 1993, the ﬁrm was privatized
through the so-called option 2 of the Russian voucher privatization,
which provided privileges to insider workers and managers in acquir-
ing shares. Since then, it has been a joint stock company. The annual
report for 1997 indicates about 92% individual ownership. A total of
53.4% of the ﬁrm is owned by insiders. Neither municipality nor the
regional government own shares, and there is no foreign capital. We
have no information about the distribution of shareholdings. However,
according to our interviews with managers in the ﬁrm, non-managerial
employees delegate their votes to the manager of their department.
Output performance The ﬁrmwent through a ﬁrst output decline
in 1987 when it had to cope with Gorbachev’s “perestroyka” (see Figure
1). Decentralization of decision-making power damaged some of the tra-
ditional supply channels and aﬀected demand. There is a steep drop in
output from the beginning of Gaidar’s reforms in 1992 onwards, which
is typical for these years, in particular, for heavy industry. From 1997,
there was a positive tendency, and in 1999, the enterprise won an im-
portant tender to supply equipment to India.
At diﬀerent points in time, the ﬁrm experimented with new product
lines, for instance, tailor-made instruments. From late 1980’s until the
late 90’s it has also been producing consumer goods (plastic chairs and
tables). However, Figure 2 shows that there is a high correlation be-
tween the ﬁrm’s output and its specialization in the core business - the
production of heavy machinery items.
Employment policies from the ﬁrm-level perspective Since
1988 and until 1997, industrial employment, that is, a number of work-
ers employed in the core operations of the ﬁrm,7 has steadily declined
7Similar to many other large industrial ﬁrms in Russia, the ﬁrm that we study had
a large number of employees in non-industrial activities such as restaurants, hospitals,
kindergartens, and housing. These individuals are out of our consideration.
4(see Figure 1). Indeed, it fell from 4813 in 1998 to 3206 in 1998. Unfor-
tunately, we cannot distinguish between an involuntary dismissal and a
voluntary quit: it is a tradition in Russia to label any separation as a
“quit”, so as to avoid subsequent stigmatization of a worker.
During transition, employment becomes more sensitive to output
changes. However, it reacts with a lag. The most important wave of
separations occurred in 1997, the ﬁrst year of transition in which the
ﬁrm’s real output has grown. Interestingly, that wave of separations
followed the top manager’s dismissal initiated by the employees: an ev-
idence of an active stance by new owners in the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, during transition, an increasing share of total wage bill
(including wage arrears and in-kind payments) is allocated to white-
collar workers (see Figure 3), and the ratio between white- and blue
collar workers increases (see Figure 4). Notice, that this implies that
more and more blue collars leave the ﬁrm (recall, that industrial employ-
ment has steadily declined).8 Hence, the ﬁrm’s defensive (costcutting)
restructuring might have mainly aﬀected its blue collar workers.9
3 Personnel policies of the ﬁrm
Personnel data In order to better understand how transition has
aﬀected the ﬁrm’s hiring and promotion policies,10 we investigate 17
years (1984-2000) of personnel ﬁles by 1538 white collar workers of the
8By the end of nineties, however, blue collars are more and more demanded by
enterprises located in the same region as the ﬁrm that we study: the ratio of while
collar- over blue collar vacancies in the region has decreased from 0.59 in 1996 to 0.2
in 2000.
9Following Grosfeld and Roland (1999), we distinguish between defensive and
strategic restructuring. For a model on defensive and strategic restructuring of
insider-privatized ﬁrms see Debande and Friebel (2005).
10Although we ﬁnd more downward mobility than in other related work (there were
120 demotions in Soviet times, and 97 during the transition), we have not studied
its determinants. The reason is that results could be diﬃcult to interpret. Indeed,
according to our interviews with human resource department, demotions are typically
used as an employment insurance, in cases when (i) an employee reaches a retirement
age, or (ii) he (she) becomes unable to fulﬁll his (her) duties for health reasons, or
else, (iii) he (she) receives a primary job outside the ﬁrm, for instance, in informal
sector.
5ﬁrm.
We use the raw data from the human resource department. An em-
ployee’s personnel ﬁle contains: a date of accession, a date of separation,
dates of movements across job titles, an occupational code for each posi-
tion deﬁned by Goskomstat, the statistical oﬃce of Russia. We also know
whether, in a given moment of time, an individual works in production
and engineering, or in administration (sales, planning, accounting).11
Moreover, we know the following personal characteristics: age, work
experience, education (years of schooling), gender, party and trade union
membership, ethnicity, marital status, number of children, place of birth,
place of university education, and ﬁeld of study. We also know some of
the job history of an individual: military service, date of leaving previous
job, last employer. Unfortunately, we do not dispose of information
about individual wages.
Hierarchy and career paths As in other related work (for in-
stance, Baker, Gibbs and Holmström, 1994), human resources, as mea-
sured by “persondays per title”,12 are concentrated on few job titles.13
In our case twelve job titles represent about 90% of core white collar
staﬀ. We hence focus on these job titles.
They are located as follows on ﬁve levels of the ﬁrm’s hierarchy (see
Figure 5).14 On level 1: technician, planning technician, and an ac-
11Recall, that we do not consider employees working in other services than core
production or administration.
12For any given individual we know (i) the date of accession into the ﬁrm, and the
accession job title (ii) duration of stay on a given job title. For each job title, we
can then add up the persondays over individuals. These persondays per title can be
expressed as a ratio of the total human resources in the ﬁrm.
13Of course, each job title contains a variety of speciﬁcations, as described by
Goskomstat’s 5 digit code. However, we have pooled down most of that variety,
keeping to make a distinction between employment in production, and in adminis-
tration.
14We know the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. Instead, Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994), had
no information about the hierarchy of the ﬁrm that they have studied. They have
built the hierarchy by looking at the ﬂows of human resources between diﬀerent job
titles. Indeed, they ﬁrst have established the lowest level of the hierarchy, mostly
ﬁlled by workers hired on the outside market. Afterwards, they have determined level
6countant; on level 2: an economist, a planning engineer, an engineer
working in production unit, and a foremen (a managerial position in
production);15 on level 3: a head of bureau, the responsible of a non-
production unit, and supervisor of a production unit; on level 4: a head
of production, and a head non-production departments; on level 5: a
top manager.
At comparing two columns of the table on Figure 5, we see that dur-
ing transition, the ﬁrm has shifted employees from production-oriented
job titles (technician, engineer) to job titles that are related to busi-
ness administration and development (accountant, economist, planning
technician, and planning engineer). Moreover, it has reallocated human
resources towards four managerial jobs (supervisor of production unit,
head of production department, head of non-production department,
and top manager).
To ﬁnd patterns of internal labour market mobility, we compute a
transition matrix that captures accessions to the ﬁrm, separations from
the ﬁrm, and movements across job titles for the whole time interval.
We ﬁnd that in Soviet times, the ﬁrm maintained career paths, some of
them leading to the very top of the company (see Figure 7). These paths
are indicted by arrows.16 A number nearby an arrow is the probability of
a person holding job title located at the bottom of the arrow to move to
job title located at which the arrow points. This picture is very similar
to the one that Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994) ﬁnd for a large
western ﬁrm.
Although in Soviet times employment and upward mobility were dis-
torted by political inﬂuence, there is some evidence that ﬁrms used pro-
2 by looking at “where do employees mostly move from level 1”. Similarly, they have
proceeded until top of the hierarchy (the general manager). We have ﬁrstly done
the same exercise. The resulting hierarchy was the same as the one which we have
received later from the human resource department of the ﬁrm.
15Becoming a “foreman” is a typical promotion for a blue collar worker.
16We here plot links between job titles that have a transition probability of at least
5%.
7motions as the main instrument to incentivise and, in particular, to
retain their workers (see Kornai, 1992). The main diﬀerence between So-
viet and western ﬁrms is not so much the use of promotions, but rather
the fact that in Soviet ﬁrms, promotions provided access to additional
fringe beneﬁt, rather than substantial wage increases.
Transition changes the ﬁrm’s promotion policies. Indeed, it becomes
more or less impossible to move upward from level 2 (see Figure 8). The
reason is that the previously existing career paths are be blocked by in-
creased hiring activity from the outside labor market to the upper levels
of the hierarchy (see Figure 9).17 Managers recruited to levels above the
second are better educated and more experiences as compared both to
(i) the incumbents, and to (ii) those managers who where recruited on
the same level in Soviet times (see Figure 6).
Hazards of promotions and exits In order to better understand
how the transition has aﬀected labour mobility inside the ﬁrm, we con-
sider separately two time intervals: 1984-1992 and 1992-2000. For each
of them, we carry out a duration analysis on two events: (i) a “promo-
tion”, that is, move from a lower- to a higher level of the hierarchy, and
(ii) a “separation” from the ﬁrm.18
We ﬁrst consider promotions. We put our data in the survival time
form. Indeed, we observe an individual as of the beginning of a time
interval (controlling for the exact date of the recruitment). To adjust
time-varying variables (like age), we make at least one record in three
years. We document the spans of time (the “survival time”) until a
promotion.19 After each promotion, the “survival time” is reset to 0.20
17These policies may be optimal response from constrained eﬃciency perspective.
We thank Marc-Andreas Muendler for his discussion of this point.
18We follow the tradition of labor economics (see Van den Berg, 2001).
19Because there is always a record at the exact date of a promotion, time interval
between two records can be shorter than three years.
20Because our data set contains repeated records of the same individuals, the as-
sumption of independence of observations may be not adequate. Therefore, we use
the robust estimate of variance controlling for identity.
8We use an accelerated failure time model in which the natural log-
arithm of the survival time is assumed to be linearly dependent on co-
variates:21
ln(tj) = xjβ + ￿,
where is a xj covariate vector, β is a vector of regression coeﬃcients,
and ￿ is an error term with density f(·). As covariates, we pick three
basic individual characteristics: age and education (to measure human
capital);22 and gender.23 We assume that the density of the error term




























, if κ = 0,
where κ and σ are ancillary parameters to be estimated from the data
(see Kalbﬂeish and Prentice, 1980).
We ﬁnd that in Soviet times, young age, male gender, and better
education were helpful in receiving a promotion. Instead, during the
transition, age and education variables are not statistically signiﬁcant
anymore (see Figure 10). More importantly, in Soviet times an employee
could increase a probability to receive a promotion by simply staying
in the ﬁrm. Unlike, during the transition, only the ﬁrst few years of
21A statistical test based on the distribution of Schoenfeld residuals rejected Cox
proportional hazard model.
22Age is highly correlated with work experience.
23We have tried to add to the set of covariates the following individual charac-
teristics: number of children, dummy for being born in the region, dummy for em-
ployment in production division of the ﬁrm at some point of the career, and party
membership. It turned out that none of them is statistically signiﬁcant, even though
we were adding them to the set of three basic covariates one by one (indeed, party
membership was signiﬁcant at 15% level in Soviet times, and became insigniﬁcant
during transition). At the same time, age, education and gender remained signiﬁcant
with the same sign in all the regressions. We have not tried to use labour union
membership as a regressor, because there is too little variation in the data: until the
year 2000, the ﬁrm remains highly (more than 80%) unionized.
24We used Akaike Information Criterion to select Generalized gamma form among
Exponential, Weibull, Lognormal, and Log-logistic, and generalized Gamma distri-
butions. Moreover, the Wald likelihood ratio test has rejected the hypothesis of a
Weibull distribution κ = 1. Hence, we have not imposed any restrictions on highly
ﬂexible baseline hazard function of the generalized Gamma distribution.
9“waiting for a promotion” where increasing the probability of this event:
“waiting for longer” was actually decreasing the probability to move up
the ﬁrm’s hierarchy (see Figure 11)!25
We proceed in a similar way, consider separations. Once again, we
use a generalized Gamma model with controlling variables being: age,
education, gender, and level in the hierarchy. The general insight is the
following. Despite worsen career perspectives during transition, people
are less likely to leave the ﬁrm (see Figure 13), especially from the upper
levels of the hierarchy (see Figure 12).26
4 Concluding discussion
In this paper we investigate how transition, a particularly drastic process
of institutional and structural change, has aﬀected the personnel policies
of a Russian ﬁrm. A sizeable literature in on enterprise restructuring in
transition measures the impact of privatization, the hardening of budget
constraints, increasing competition, and price liberalization on enterprise
performance (see Djankov and Murrell 2001). Insider-privatized ﬁrms
usually show little signs of restructuring, while ﬁrms that are privatized
to outsiders, in particular to foreigners, are more likely to improve their
performance. In order to learn more about the micro channels through
which transition aﬀect enterprise performance, we “open the black box”
of a heavy industry ﬁrm. The main changes after the reforms are as
follows.
(i) employment becomes more responsive to output changes after priva-
tization;
(ii) the wage bill is reallocated from blue- to white collars;
(iii) separations aﬀect blue collars, whereas white collars, especially those
25Notice also, that the incidence of promotion during the transition is only 64, as
compared to 150 in Soviet times (the number of individuals in the two periods is
more or less the same).
26There were only 316 separations during transition, as compared to 609 in Soviet
times.
10working on the upper tiers of the hierarchy, are less likely to leave the
ﬁrm than before the reforms;
(iv) the use of white collar human resources is shifted from production-
to administrative and management activities;
(v) more white collars are hired from the outside labour market, in par-
ticular for higher levels of its hierarchy;
(vi) the ﬁrm becomes “toploaded”, and promotions are blocked.
A possible story behind these changes is as follows. After the ﬁrm’s
privatization, the incumbent managers became the owners. Weak out-
sider property right enforcement created strong incentives for them to
stay inside the ﬁrm. At the same time, the labor market became thicker,
making it possible to hire new workers and managers with a high human
capital. Manager-owners did not forego these recruitment opportunities
in order to be able to maintain career paths.
This interpretation ﬁrstly, points at the limits to a ﬁrm’s beneﬁts
from maintaining career paths; secondly, it indicates a new channel
through which corporate governance may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s human resource
policies. We hope that these issues will receive better understanding in
the future research.
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